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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a petition for review over which the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(a) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Petition for Review in this case was timely filed pursuant to §63-46b-
14(3)(a) Utah Code Annotated. 
2. Whether the notice provided to Donna K. Kounalis by the Utah State Retirement 
Board on May 22, 1992 met the requirements of procedural due process necessary to 
preclude the petitioner from filing a request for hearing more than thirty days following the date 
of that notice. 
3. Whether the refusal of the Adjudicative Hearing Officer to lengthen the time period 
for the petitioner to file a Request for Board Action was arbitrary or capricious. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
817 P. 2d 316 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Constitutional Provisions: 
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." 
Statutes: 
Section 63-46b-14(3)(a): 
"A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency 
action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting 
the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been 
issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)." 
Section 63-46b-16(4): 
"The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis 
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of 
the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is base, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied;... 
(h) the agency action i s : . . . 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious." 
Section 63-46b-1 (9): 
"Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a 
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from lengthening 
or shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter, except 
those time periods established for judicial review." 
Section 63-46b-2(1)(h)(i): 
"Presiding Officer" means an agency head, or an individual 
or body of individuals designated by the agency head, by the 
agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an adjudicative 
proceeding." 
A 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a petition for review of a formal adjudicative proceeding of the Utah State 
Retirement Board. On May 22, 1992, the Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement 
Systems issued a letter to Donna K. Kounalis denying her death benefits under a policy of life 
insurance alleged to have been in effect on the date of her husband's death. [Exhibit "A" to 
Petition for Review.] The petitioner maintains that the enclosures referred to in that letter were 
not enclosed. Thereafter, on January 2, 1993, the petitioner served a notice of claim on the 
Utah Retirement Systems and the State of Utah by certified mail. [Exhibit "B" to Petition for 
Review.] In response, the Utah State Retirement Systems requested the petitioner to file a 
Request for Board Action, which she did. [Exhibit "C" to Petition for Review.] The respondent 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Request for Board Action in May, 1993 [Exhibit "D" to Petition for 
Review] which was heard by the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on July 1, 1993. After 
consideration of supplemental memoranda, the hearing officer issued a Recommended Order 
on January 11,1994 granting the Motion to Dismiss of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
[Exhibit "H" to Petition to Review.] Due to the fact that the Recommended Order was not 
served upon the Petitioner's Attorney, The Adjudicative Hearing Officer granted the Petitioner 
thirty days from the date of that notice (February 7, 1994) to file a petition for judicial review. 
[See Exhibit T to Petition for Review.] This Petition for Review was filed thereafter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ray H. Kounalis, deceased, was employed by the Utah Department of Corrections as a 
career employee until his death on January 4, 1992. Following his death, his surviving spouse, 
the petitioner Donna K. Kounalis, applied for death benefits under a policy of life insurance 
held by her deceased husband. 
After reviewing that application, Mrs. Kounalis's request for death benefits was denied by M. 
Dee Williams, Executive Director of Utah Retirement Systems. [Exhibit "A" to Petition for 
Review.] 
The petitioner maintains that the brochure referred to in the letter dated May 22, 1992 
from M. Dee Williams [Exhibit "A" to Petition for Review] was not in fact enclosed. Since no 
time limits were set forth in the letter, Mrs. Kounalis took no action until January 2, 1993 when 
she contacted an attorney, Franklin L. Slaugh, who immediately served a notice of claim upon 
the respondent and upon the state of Utah. [Exhibit "B" to Petition for Review.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is distinguishable from Dusty's Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Commission, 842 P. 2d 868 (Utah 1992). Counsel for Petitioner relied on the letter from the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer in filing the Petition for Review later than 30 days after the 
issuance of the Recommended Order, a copy of which was not mailed to petitioner's attorney. 
Constitutional questions are characterized as questions of law and agency 
determinations are to be reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to 
the agency's decision. 
The notice provided by the Utah State Retirement Board to the petitioner, Donna K. Kounalis, 
did not meet constitutional standards of procedural due process. The letter of May 22, 1992 
did not inform the petitioner of the time period in which she could appeal the Executive 
Director's decision or request a hearing on the matter nor did it apprise Mrs. Kounalis of the 
consequences of her failing to act within a time certain. Given the substantive rights involved, 
i.e., the entitlement to death benefits in the sum of $18,000.00, the notice provided to the 
petitioner in the letter of May 22, 1992 was constitutionally deficient and Mrs. Kounalis has 
been deprived of due process of law under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: The Petition for Review was Timely Filed. 
The Petition for Review was filed within twenty-nine (29) days following the notice sent 
to the Petitioner's Attorney by the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on February 7, 1994. Section 
16-46b-14(3)(a) Utah Code Annotated has been construed by this Court to require that the 
petition for review be filed within 30 days from the date the order is issued. Dusty's, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Commission, supra. However, in Dusty's, Dusty's Inc., the 
petitioner, filed its petition for review thirty-three (33) days after the agency order was issued. 
No extension of time had been granted by the Tax Commission. In the case at bar, if the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer had not expressly extended the time in his letter of February 7, 
1994, counsel for the Petitioner, Donna K. Kounalis, could have proceeded accordingly and 
filed the petition for review within the time remaining (thirty days from January 11,1994). The 
adjudicative hearing officer did not enlarge the time beyond thirty days; he simply modified the 
date from which the thirty days would run. It would be extremely unfair to penalize the 
Petitioner for relying upon the notice provided to Petitioner's counsel by the hearing officer. 
This Court may therefore properly review the agency action pursuant to the Petition for Review 
filed herein. 
Point II: The Notice Provided by the Utah State Retirement Board to the Petitioner 
Did Not Meet Constitutional Standards of Due Process. 
The Petitioner has filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(4)(a) Utah 
Code Annotated asking the Court of Appeals to set aside the Order of the Respondent 
granting the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petitioner's Request for Board Action. 
Because the Petitioner raises a constitutional question, i.e., adequacy of notice, this Court 
should review the Petition for Review under a correction of error standard, giving no deference 
to the agency action. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, supra. 
Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to heard in a meaningful way are at the 
very heart of procedural fairness. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P. 2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Worrall v. 
Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P. 2d 598 (Utah 1980); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
The landmark case of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) 
defined adequate notice as follows: 
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in 
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as 
reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford 
a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance." 
[Citations omitted.] at 314. 
In the case of Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department, supra, the plaintiff contended that 
the letter of discharge given him by Ogden City Fire Department did not give him notice of the 
five day limitation in which to seek review of his termination and that that procedure violated 
fundamental fairness and his rights to procedural due process. The Utah Supreme Court 
agreed, stating, 
"Under the due process clause, plaintiff was entitled to have 
this essential information imparted to him; that he might make 
an intelligent and informed decision as to whether to waive his 
constitutional right to a post-termination hearing. The letter 
discharging the plaintiff should have contained a notice of his 
right to a hearing and the time limitation on this right." [emphasis 
added] at 602. 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized on more than one occasion that "due process" is 
not a technical formula with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, supra, at 1213. In the case of Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P. 2d 338 
(Utah 1980), the court said that rather, "the demands of due process rest on the concept of 
ft 
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the 
parties involved." at 341. 
In the instant case, the letter in question, [Exhibit "A" to Petition for Review.] does not 
advise the petitioner of any time limitation whatsoever within which to file a Request for Board 
Action. The notice was therefore deficient under the standard enunciated in Worrell, supra, 
and the petitioner is entitled to a hearing on the merits of her request for death benefits. The 
circumstances of the petitioner at the time she received the letter of May 22, 1992 should be 
taken into account in arriving at a determination of whether she was afforded adequate notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. Her husband of many years had only recently died, leaving 
her in financial straits (Mrs. Kounalis filed a petition in bankruptcy following the death of her 
husband.) and it is not incomprehensible that the petitioner did not perceive the letter of May 
22d as being of such finality that it demanded her immediate attention. The letter not only 
does not contain any time limitations, it does not address the consequences of a failure to act 
on the part of Mrs. Kounalis. This simply does not meet constitutional standards of due 
process under Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah as interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court. For this reason, the Recommended Order of the Respondent issued on 
January 11, 1994 should be set aside and the matter remanded to the agency for a hearing on 
the merits of petitioner's claim. 
Point III: The Decision of the Adjudicative Hearing Officer in Refusing to 
Lengthen the Time Period for Petitioner to File a Request for Board Action was 
Arbitrary and Capricious. 
Section 63-46b-1(9) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) permits a presiding 
officer to lengthen or shorten any time period prescribed in that chapter, except those time 
periods established for judicial review. Under Section 63-46b-2(1)(h)(i) "presiding officer" is 
defined as "an agency head, or an individual or body of individuals designated by the agency 
head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an adjudicative proceeding." 
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer in this case could therefore have lengthened the time 
period for petitioner to file a Request for Board Action. Section 63-46b-1(9) does not 
specifically state upon what grounds such a determination should be based. "Good cause" 
appears to be the standard utilized by some administrative agencies. Maverik Country Stores 
v. Industrial Commission, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah App. 1993). Inasmuch as the 
Recommended Order of the Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued in this case does not 
expressly address the issue of whether good cause existed for an extension, it is unclear as to 
whether or not he even considered the petitioner's circumstances. With no findings of fact 
rendered on that issue, except to state that," the Petitioner filed for Board Action on April 25, 
1993, some eleven months after her claim for benefits was denied," this decision appears to 
be completely arbitrary. In fact the respondent was served with the notice of claim [Exhibit "B" 
to Petition for Review] on January 4, 1993. It was only after considerable delay and 
miscommunication on the part of the respondent, that petitioner was informed that she would 
have to submit a Request for Board Action. [See copies of letters reproduced in App. 1, 2 and 
3.] 
In sum, the refusal of the Adjudicative Hearing Officer to lengthen the time period for 
filing a Request for Board Action, under the facts of this case, was arbitrary and capricious. 
The refusal was not based upon any finding that no good cause existed. In fact, there was no 
specific finding rendered. It is therefore respectfully requested that the Recommended Order 
of the Respondent issued on January 11,1994 be set aside and the matter remanded to the 
agency for a hearing on the merits of the petitioner's claim. 
i n 
CONCLUSION 
The notice given to the petitioner in the letter from the Executive Director of the 
Respondent on May 22, 1992 was inadequate and did not meet constitutional standards of 
fairness and due process. No time period for the petitioner to file the Request for Board Action 
was set forth in the letter and any doubt as to whether the brochure referred to in the letter was 
enclosed should be resolved in favor of the petitioner under the facts of this case. 
The refusal of the Adjudicative Hearing Officer to lengthen the time period for filing was not 
based upon any findings and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. 
The petitioner should be granted the opportunity of a fair and full hearing of her claim on the 
merits. The only issue to be resolved in that hearing involves the interpretation of an insurance 
contract. No prejudice will result to the Respondent by allowing the petitioner to present her 
case. There are no witnesses whose memories might have been affected by the passage of 
time or who might be unavailable. The legal issues to be resolved can be adjudicated as 
easily now as then. 
For all of the above reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court set aside 
the Recommended Order of the Respondent and remand this case for hearing 
on the merits of petitioner's claim. 
Respectfully submitted: 
Franklin L Slaugh 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Kevin A. Howard, 
Attorney for Respondent, 560 East 200 South, Suite 230, Salt Lake City, UT 84102, postage 
prepaid, this day of , 1994. 
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APPENDIX 
Letter of Kevin Howard to Franklin L. Slaugh dated February 15, 1993. 
Letter of Franklin L. Slaugh to Kevin A. Howard dated March 16,1993. 
Letter of Kevin Howard to Franklin L. Slaugh dated March 23, 1993. 
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Kevin A. Howard 
Attorney at Law 
540 East 200 South #426 Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 (801) 366-7471 
February 15, 1993 
Franklin L. Slaugh 
Attorney and Counselor 
9341 South 1300 East 
Sandy, UT 84094 
Dear Sir: 
PEHP has forwarded your letter to me dated January 2, 1993 for response. Your letter was 
unclear as to whether you were aware of the circumstances surroimding the denial of benefits to your 
client, Bay Kounalis. The claim was denied because Mr. Kounalis was covered by the 1987 policy and not 
the 1989 policy administered by PEHP. 
While our current Gem State policy contains an $18,000 life insurance benefit, the policy in effect 
prior to July 1,1989, contained language to exclude from coverage anyone who had reached age 60 at the 
time of disability. You will find enclosed copies of the relevant pages of the booklet. 
You of course have the right to appeal this decision to Dee Williams, Executive Director of the 
Utah Retirement Systems. The appeal section of the code is found under U.C.A. § 49-6-10. I am assuming 
that is what you intended by your reference to § 63-30-11 in your letter. You will also find enclosed a copy 
of the appeals form. 
Sincerely, 
Kevin A. Howard 
Attorney for PEHP/ 
Utah Retirement Systems 
Enclosures 
KAHrlh 
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH, RC. 
Attorney & Counselor 
March 16, 1993 
Kevin A. Howard 
Attorney at Law 
540 East 200 South 
Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Donna Kounalis v. PEHP/Utah Retirement Systems 
Dear Mr. Howard: 
I have attempted to reach you by telephone to discuss your letter of February 
15, 1993 with reference to Ray Kounalis, deceased. 
Your letter indicated that my client had the right to appeal the decision 
denying coverage on the life of Mr. Kounalis and you referenced a section of 
the Utah Code (§49-6-10) which I could not find in the current volume of the 
Utah Code. 
My client does desire to appeal that decision and you may consider this letter 
a request for that hearing. You made reference to an appeal form which was 
not enclosed with your letter. If in fact there is a form which you desire 
me to complete on behalf of my client, please send me the form and I will 
do so. 
If this proceeding is an adjudicative proceeding within the meaning of §63-46b-3 
Utah Code Ann., would you please notify me in accordance with that section if 
the proceeding is to be conducted formally or informally. 
Sincerely, 
Franklin L. Slaugh 
Attorney for Donna Kounalis 
FLS/ps 
<mi Smith 1300 East. Sandy, Utah 84094 
V 
Kevin A. Howard 
Attorney at Law 
540 East 200 South #426 Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 (801) 366-7471 
March 23, 1993 
Franklin Slaugh 
Attorney and Counselor 
9341 South 1300 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Dear Mr. Slaugh: 
As you know, I represent the Utah Public Employees Health Plan 
and the Utah State Retirement Board. I am following up on 
telephone conversations that I had recently with yourself and Wilda 
Madsen, the assistant to M. Dee Williams, Executive Director of the 
Utah Retirement Systems. 
The letter that I sent to you on February 15, 1993, indicated 
that your client had a right to appeal the denial decision to 
M. Dee Williams, Executive Director of the Retirement Systems. 
Upon further conversations with Ms. Madsen, however, it appears 
that this information was already given to your client on May 22, 
1992. This denial letter from Mr. Williams began the process under 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act which allowed up to 30 days 
to appeal that decision. We have no record of any appeal on file 
in this office. Since your client did not file the appeal, we are 
legally bound to deny your request. 
If you have any information which would provide a contrary 
result, please inform me as soon as possible. 
Sincerely, 
K4-A 
Kevin A. Howard 
KAH:lh 
